ve was the first empirical, behavioral scientist; Adam was the first practitioner. Therein lay the genesis of a problem. Eve persuaded Adam to engage in an experiment designed to test a differential hypothesis: Would eating the fruit make her suffer as God said or bring great knowledge and power to her as the serpent promised? Both hypotheses were supported-she gained knowledge and she experienced pain. And Adam, practicing in the way Eve dictated, suffered the fate of her illconceived experiment. So it was that science began to lose its credibility among practitioners. Perhaps some ancient record, still undiscovered, will indicate when some forgotten but charismatic shaman finally introduced the term clinical findings as a substitute for the by-then-diminished one, empirical findings, to be used as an explanation and guide to practice. But we are sure that it was not long afterward that scientists, being unsettled at having their position questioned, began expressing disapproval for the diminishing influence of scientific research on practice.
Different values have always guided the ethos of discovery and the ethos of application in clinical psychology. The stresses presented by these differences parallel those present in many fields, a point that is frequently unrecognized by psychologists. Yet the universality of this distinction may indicate some fundamental processes that are important to the development and maintenance of the professions of applied psychology. Answers to the questions of what needs to be known (Spence, 1994) , who needs to know it, and how it is to become known are different in the perceptions and preferences of practitioners and researchers. The body of knowledge that stimulates interest among these two groups has always been the basis for conflict (Greenberg, 1994) . On the one hand, researchers argue that clinicians are poorly equipped and uninformed in their efforts to help patients and suggest that scientific information is the avenue to correct their misguided efforts (e.g., Cohen, 1985; Davison & Lazarus, 1994; Garfield, 1994) . On the other hand, clinicians (Edelson, 1994; Havens, 1994) argue that the perspectives of researchers are overly simplified and fail to address the needs of the day-to-day, in-session struggles of therapists and patients. Maling and Howard (1994) suggested that a major factor that inhibits the application of research is that empirical findings derive from the average patient, a statistical abstraction that does not represent any actual person. To those who take this view, scientists have failed to demonstrate the relevance of their research in the complex matters of individual patient care. This viewpoint is echoed by many eminent scientist-practitioners, over the past decades, who have bemoaned how little science has informed their own practices (e.g., Barlow, 1981; Strupp, 1981) .
Alternatively, perhaps it is simply that the attention of practitioners is diverted by the enchantments of other, more optimistic messages, the inherent pessimism of science rendering it impotent (see Strieker, 1992) . Many observers have accepted this latter viewpoint and suggest that the scientific methods of gathering and reporting information must change if the message of science is to get across. Thus, these critics recommend that researchers reduce their reliance on group research designs, increase Larry E. Beutier the credence given to case studies, and discard statistical and nonclinical language in publications (see Cohen, 1985; Cohen, Sargent, & Sechrest, 1986; Falvey, 1989; Gelso, 1985) . However, to the degree that these recommendations have been attempted, they have failed both to change research practices and to increase the estimated frequency with which clinicians apply research knowledge.
The failure of these efforts suggest that the disparity of values that distinguish researchers and practitioners is more complex than a simple disagreement about how research should be reported and what methods should be used. The influence of personal concerns with status and competence cannot be ignored. Greenberg (1994) , for example, observed that therapists are considered "insiders" and researchers are suspicious "outsiders" in the arena of practice. The admonitions of "outsiders" in discussions of clinical activity immediately arouse suspicion among clinicians. There may be fear that, if allowed, researchers will both observe the weaknesses of practice and dismiss the worth of those theoretical constructs valued by clinicians. Interestingly, most of the predominant ideas in the field of psychotherapy have arisen out of extensive direct therapeutic contact, not from research directly. Indeed, there is concern that without the benefit of day-to-day practice, researchers may be unprepared to understand what happens in the process of treatment (Elliott & Morrow-Bradley, 1994) .
The Universality of the Science-Practice Split
A recent perusal of the library turned up some interesting titles and articles published in recent years. For example, an article entitled "The Dilemma of Scientific Knowledge Versus Clinical Management" sounds familiar but is not in Professional Psychology. It is a discourse on temporomandibular disorders (Mohl & Ohrback, 1992) , bemoaning the failure of dental clinicians to acknowledge and use scientifically derived findings to guide their work. Another familiar sounding title is "Theory and Practice: Bridging Scientists' and Practitioners' Roles" (Hoffman & Bertus, 1992) . This article is not in Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, however. It criticizes nurses for a lack of scientific respect and sensitivity to empirical issues.
Still another article, entitled "Gastrointestinal Endoscopy and General Surgical Practice" (Donohue & Sugitani, 1991) , criticizes surgeons for replacing scientific findings with clinical lore. Another, entitled "Trouble in Paradigms" (Anderson, 1992) , contends that "the scientific method involving hypothesis testing has dominated consumer research theory and practice far too long" (p. 87)-obviously the writings of a practitioner. Similar titles and articles are in journals in physics, chemistry, computer science, education, and even the construction industry. Like the mind-body dichotomy, the sciencepractice duality is so pervasive that in some realms of study, separate disciplines have evolved, such as physics and engineering; biology/physiology and medicine; and educational psychology and education. Even intradisciplinary distinctions are made-theoretical and applied physics, music theory and performance, and the likewith corresponding conflicts over the relative status to be accorded to each.
In virtually every discipline in which the usual access to knowledge is through the scientific method, scientists have lamented that practitioners are inadequately trained, are insensitive to the value of scientific findings, and fail to read the right journals. Conversely, practitioners are dismayed because scientists offer too little, are consumed by irrelevant questions, and fail to appreciate the knowledge that arises from practice. This is not to say that the discord between science and practice is good or bad. Nor is it to say that these arguments are unimportant. It does suggest that there may be a certain inevitability in these conflicts by virtue of the fact that those who practice are drawn from a different population than those who do research. If any other set of complex behaviors were at once so clearly problematic and so independent of culture and discipline, we imagine that someone immediately would suggest that it is genetic and someone else would suggest that it is a disease and warrants a formal diagnosis. Perhaps the pervasiveness of this split indicates that something is amiss in the traditional efforts to address the problem. An example is warranted.
Animal Training: Science or Practice
The split between the science of ethology and the practice of animal training offers a parallel set of issues and solutions to psychology's own split between clinical science and clinical practice. For example, in the profession of horse training, unlike the world of clinical practice, one's results are made obvious through systematic competition. In the world of western riding, the epitome of achievement is to win the National Reined Cowhorse Championship.
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Success in this form requires that the horse perform very complex maneuvers with a high level of precision, following patterns and routinized moves designed to demonstrate the animal's ability as an athlete and both the rider's and trainer's ability to bring the horse under precise control. Fewer athletes make it to this level of competition than reach the National Basketball Association.
Ordinarily, reined cowhorse trainers are practitioners who are unimpressed by behavioral science. The "science" that underlies horse training, for most practitioners, is in the establishment of good breeding programs. The lore of horse training comes from tradition and is transmitted from trainer to protege through extended apprenticeships. In contrast to the reliance on this "practical wisdom" and managed breeding programs, some more controversial trainers such as Parelli (1993) have used behavioral theories to explain and describe the process of training. Scientific terms and concepts are used by Parelli as a way to explain his results, but he discovered the principles of application through "clinical" experience.
Sounding suspiciously like a psychotherapist, Parelli (1993) considered the quality of the horse-person relationship to be the overarching factor in success. His procedures have been designed to develop and cement that relationship, a process that requires overcoming a natural tension between prey animal and predator. From his understanding of ethology and social biology, he proposed that, as prey animals, horses are motivated by different things than predators such as dogs and humans. In contrast to his colleagues, he proposed that fear is a more effective motivator than pain or appetitive reinforcement. Thus, Parelli has systematically induced fear through sudden or novel visual and auditory stimuli and has then offered the horse relief and safety through proximity and obedience to a human being.
The means by which he has shaped behavior are precisely behavioral and are described in terms borrowed directly from behavioral psychology, although these latter terms are sometimes used incorrectly. For example, although his "release" technique is a perfect demonstration of what are technically negative reinforcement and shaping procedures, he has viewed the difference between punishment and negative reinforcement as being only the speed with which it is applied (Parelli, personal communication, 1994) . He has also misidentified the distinction between operant and respondent conditioning paradigms. Other aspects of his theory have only limited empirical support, such as his attribution of reinforcement effects to endorphins and imprinting.
In order to demonstrate the validity of the application of his theory, Parelli earned his fame by winning the National Reined Cowhorse Championship, but he did so on a mule. Parelli's practical knowledge was gained through experience rather than in the laboratory; his scientific descriptions are sometimes inaccurate; his theory is lacking scientific foundation at crucial points-but this single demonstration disproved the assumed preeminence of scientific breeding over good training.
We suggest that the foregoing example illustrates more than the chance translation of serendipitously discovered scientific principles to a field of practice. Parelli is a clinician whose expertise is explained by, but not attributable only to, his use of behavioral principles. We venture to suggest that a behavioral scientist who is formally and properly schooled in the principles of operant conditioning through lectures and laboratory assignments and who is armed with technically correct facts and terms may still be poorly skilled when asked to apply even the most simple behavioral principles to the task of preparing a horse to compete in the National Reined Cowhorse Championships. In addition to procedural knowledge, Parelli has acquired hands-on experience and possesses an extremely creative and fertile mind, and this-rather than technical correctness-propels him to contrive effective situations in which the principles of behavioral control can operate. It may be in the creation of situations in which learning and conditioning can occur that the real contributions of clinical practice lie, more than in the abilities of clinicians to apply behavioral principles. Experience may actually add something of value to scientific knowledge.
We wonder what a more exact knowledge of scientific findings would offer Parelli. Would he be more effective than he is if he read the Journal of Experimental Psychology or the Journal of Animal Behavior? Would he become more skilled if he took an advanced behavioral management course? Is it necessary that he know the technical definition of negative reinforcement to be a scientist-practitioner? We doubt that accurate scientific terms and definitions would make Parelli a better practitioner.
Extension to the Science and Practice of Psychology
As suggested in the foregoing example, among skilled practitioners, scientific findings may serve purposes other Phylis J. Wakefleld than k rtedge generation. For example, they (a) confirm experituually derived knowledge, (b) provide credible explanations for observations, and (c) facilitate transmitting knowledge from one to another. The example of Parelli raises the question of whether, through their experience, good clinical practitioners can find their own way to the fund of basic knowledge that has been derived for the scientist in the experimental psychopathology, psychotherapy, or behavior therapy laboratories. Are there other roads to knowledge that might be as valuable or even more valuable as means of discovery than the scientific method?
It is possible that the answers to these latter questions depend on one's level of skill. The function of research findings for very good practitioners may be to prove what is already known^that psychotherapy is effective and that the relationship is cardinal to achieving benefit. Science as a guide to practice may be most useful for the unskilled, for that practitioner whose personal theory ceases to provide effective guidance, and for times when the clinician is uncomfortable and seeking new avenues of change.
Of course, one may also wonder whether Parelli could offer anything that would advance a science of animal behavior. Could a scientist develop new knowledge from observing this practitioner? Indeed, we believe that the animal scientist could learn a great deal by studying Parelli's clinical methods, a point to be considered by clinical psychologists in their relationships with practitioners.
After surveying southern California psychologists, psychiatrists, family counselors, and social workers, we (Beutler, Williams, & Wakefield, 1993) recently advanced the unconventional theory that practitioners believe in, value, and seek out scientific knowledge to a significantly greater degree than usually believed (see similar findings by Kazdin, Siegel, & Bass, 1990) . These findings indicated that clinicians use scientific knowledge selectively to solve particular problems, but search for knowledge in places where science was unlikely to be. In our sample, 80% of practitioners not only held a respectful view of science, but reported reading scientific articles and journals regularly. However, when asked to identify these "scientific journals and articles," they listed professional newspapers (APA Monitor, Psychiatric News, etc., 76%), practiceoriented journals (58%), and popular books (51 %) as the major sources of knowledge. Only 35% of our mixed professional, practitioner sample (50% of psychologists) identified a conventional empirical journal among the sources of their "scientific" information.
We concluded that practitioners are open to scientific findings, but that they accept both a different definition of "science" and adopt a different criteria of evidence than those used by academic, behavioral scientists. Practitioners looked to secondary sources, usually written by nonscientists, rather than research journals as sources of scientific information. If this is true, then efforts aimed at persuading practitioners to read scientific journals may be doomed to failure. Such an approach ignores the population, the valued sources of knowledge, and the role differences that distinguish practitioners and scientists.
As a result of these findings, we argued that research journals may be inappropriate vehicles for guiding clinical practice. We maintained that empirical reports were driven by some scientific motives that were not shared with practitioners. Our findings convinced us that altering research methods and reporting procedures would not enhance the task of communicating with practitioners. Moreover, we argued that there were good reasons why empirical scientists use the technical language and descriptions of research reports that are not always of interest or comprehensible to the practitioner. We concluded that empirical journals should remain a means of communicating among scientists. We argued that in the field of psychological science and practice, there was a need to develop means for scientists to talk directly to practitioners about how to address the problems that face them.
We have recently completed a national survey that was designed to extend the results of our earlier work by comparing the attitudes and perceptions of academic and practicing clinical psychologists, an educationally more homogeneous group than the one surveyed in our first study. To our knowledge, the recent survey is the first effort to determine if and how academic scientists use clinicians' knowledge to guide their research, rather than just vice versa. In the following paragraphs, we will review some of the findings of this survey and will then suggest some guidelines that derive from this work by which scientists might begin to bridge the gap with practitioners.
A Study of Practitioners and Academic Researchers

Sample
We submitted surveys to 500 practitioners and 500 clinical academic psychologists. Both groups were identified from the National Register through a process of randomly Stephanie R. Entwistle selecting from those whose office addresses were either at universities (researchers) or in mental health facilities (clinicians). Only 1.6% of the scientist-practitioner surveys and 5.6% of the clinician surveys were undeliverable. A total of 365 surveys were returned after initial and follow-up contact (221 scientists and 144 practitioners), representing an acceptable return rate of 38% (Mahoney & Craine, 1991) . This list was then "cleaned" by removing from the "scientist" list those who listed "Private Practice" or "Counseling" as their primary activity (n = 30), and from the "practitioner" list those who listed "College" or "University" instruction as their primary practice activity (n = 10). The result was a sample of 191 academics and 134 practitioners.
Ninety-nine percent (99.3%) of the practitioners and 97.4% of the research samples were European American. Their mean ages were 44.40 (SD = 9.50) and 44.53 (SD = 10.5), respectively. Somewhat more of the practitioner sample was female (39.6%) than the researcher sample (19.4%), probably reflecting a differential composition of the population. However, mean levels of experience were comparable (19.40 years [SD = 8.74] for practitioners and 22.31 [SD = 9.60] years for researchers). The majority (74.60%) of practitioners were in independent practice, with another 23% indicating their primary employment was in a mental health clinic or hospital. All (100%) of the researcher sample listed university teaching as their major employment.
Instrument
The survey instrument was a refinement of the one piloted in our original study (Beutler et al., 1993) and consisted of 32 items that required categorical, rating, or narrative responses. The original items were modified and refined as a function of the pilot study. The questions related to three content areas: (a) identity of articles, journals, books, and professional newspapers read; (b) ratings of the degree to which research has contributed to one's professional activities and practices; and (c) perceived problems in translating research to practice. Like the original version, the revised questionnaire relied on face validity. The results were recorded as ratings on five-point Likert scales and the nominal identification, by name, of journals, books, newspapers, organizations, and so on. We classified, by consensus, the named journals into one of three categories: (a) general psychological, (b) research, or (c) practice, based upon masthead descriptions of focus. A similar classification of books was based on consensual rankings and reviews of prefaces and references.
Results
Data were analyzed by a series of chi squared analyses of frequency data, with Likert ratings being subjected to one-way analyses of variance, applying Bonferonni's correction to reduce family-wise error rates.
The first task was to distinguish between the type of journal preferred and the frequency of reading journals of various types. Both groups were initially asked to indicate on an anchored five-point scale how frequently they read journals that report primary research findings. They were then asked to apply the same rating scale to indicate how frequently they read journals that did not report research results directly. Table 1 reveals that the modal frequency of reading research articles among academic researchers was weekly, compared with monthly among clinicians. Applying a one-way analysis of variance to the ratings revealed a significant group effect. Surprisingly, academic researchers reported that they also read nonresearch journals at a somewhat higher frequency than their clinician counterparts. Researchers indicated that they read nonresearch journals at a mean frequency of about twice per month, compared with about once in three weeks among clinicians.
Next, respondents were asked to identify the journal most frequently read during the past month. A comparison of frequencies among research, general, or practiceoriented journals surprisingly revealed that both groups tended to favor research journals over either general or practice-oriented ones. A series of 2 (group) X 2 (target journal vs. other) chi square analyses were used to compare the likelihood of selecting each journal type. Table  2 reveals that over half of the journals identified by clinicians and nearly three quarters of those identified by researchers were research-oriented journals. Although both groups preferred these latter journals, the difference was significant, indicating that more researchers had recently read these journals than had clinicians. Interestingly, in contrast to t^eir general estimate of how often they read practice-oriented journals, when academic researchers identified recently read journals, only a small percentage of these were actually practice-oriented. A slight but significantly higher percentage of clinicians' than researcher's readings were practice-oriented. Differences in the frequency of reading general journals were nonsignificant. Next, we attempted to assess the degree to which each group benefited from reading the literature of the other group. We asked each academic respondent to indicate, on a series of five-point Likert-type scales (not-atall to significantly), the helpfulness, to their research programs, of reading practice-oriented articles. Concomitantly, practitioners were asked to rate the helpfulness of reading research articles for their clinical practices, using the same scale. Significant differences (Table 3) emerged between the two groups on two of the three questions that addressed this issue. Although the groups did not differ in the rated degree to which cross-fertilization increased awareness of the importance of issues, clinicians found research literature to be more important than researchers found clinical literature, for both providing a conceptual framework for their activities-in this case providing case formulations-and in changing their practices.
We also asked both groups to rate the usefulness of cross-readings in seven specific areas. In each of the areas, researchers were asked to rate the usefulness of clinical articles and clinicians were asked to rate the usefulness of research articles using a five-point Likert scale (low to high). The results (Table 3) followed a consistent pattern, with six of the seven comparisons reaching statistical significance. Clinicians valued cross-reading more than academic researchers around topics that described (a) the development and impact of the therapeutic alliance, (b) psychotherapeutic interventions, (c) comparisons of treatment differences, (d) patient-therapist processes that lead to change, (e) specific cases and their management, and (f) linkages between types of treatment and various patient variables. Only articles describing specific theoretical orientations failed to distinguish clinician and researcher interest levels.
Finally, each group was asked to indicate the avenues of communication that would be most effective in reaching them if members of the other group wanted them to receive important information. They checked one or more of the following alternatives: (a) books, (b) articles in professional newsletters/newspapers, (c) electronic networks, (d) local conferences and workshops, (e) formal consultations with others, (f) mail, (g) informal discus- Table 4 , significant differences were observed in the degree to which clinicians tended to favor professional newsletters as a method of communicating scientific findings. In contrast, researchers suggested that research articles and informal consultation with colleagues were favored as avenues of communication about clinical practices. Forty-six percent of researchers said they could best be reached through research journals, whereas only 19% of clinicians chose this avenue of communication. In contrast, 47% of clinicians marked national conferences and a similar number checked clinical newspapers/newsletters as the most effective means of communicating with them. Interestingly, the avenues preferred by each group were the ones that were least likely to be used as a means of communicating with the other.
Discussion
The findings from our national survey suggest that clinicians may be much more interested in research than academics conventionally believe. Clinicians report that they find research writings to be useful and that they regularly incorporate these findings into their daily work. Conversely, academics do not acknowledge the value of clinical practice, indicating that clinical writings are less useful and are read less often by them than scientific writings are read by clinicians. Moreover, academic researchers suggest decidedly unrealistic ways in which clinicians might correspond with them in order to establish collaboration-by writing research articles. These findings suggest that to the degree that communication is going on between scientists and clinicians in psychology, it is largely one directional: Clinicians value and listen to science more than scientists value and listen to clinicians. Can communication be effective if it only goes in one direction?
Perhaps the lack of importance assigned to clinical literature by academic researchers indicates that this literature has little to offer of researchable value. Another possibility, however, is that scientists may be missing im-portant avenues for identifying critical areas of research. They may do a better scientific job if they were more attentive to the writings and ideas of their clinical colleagues. This is quite a different viewpoint than the conventional one expressed when the topic of science versus practice arises in academic circles. In these dialogues, clinicians are frequently blamed for being uninterested in research, and it is not uncommon for accusations of ethical violations to be levied against them. Although these data do reveal a degree of research apathy among approximately half of the clinicians surveyed, that is not a universal characteristic of clinicians. If academics are to learn anything from these findings it is that (a) publishing in applied journals and newsletters may be a useful way to help clinicians develop their practices, and (b) talking to clinicians may be helpful in prioritizing and formulating research questions.
Prior research has suggested a number of topics and strategies that academic scientists may use to promote a facilitative dialogue with therapists. These include, but are not limited to (a) determining therapist interests, (b) conducting more frontline research, (c) addressing philosophy of science issues, (d) encouraging therapists to do research and researchers to do therapy, (e) maintaining an openness to all perspectives, and (f) recognizing limits of theory-guided research (Elliott & Morrow-Bradley, 1994) . At the same time Safran and Muran (1994) have pointed out that there are positive clinical by-products of research that may accumulate to the practitioner. These include (a) developing an empirical attitude, (b) developing conceptual clarity, (c) making the implicit explicit, (d) demystifying psychotherapy, and (e) increasing the accountability of the profession. A partnership between the clinician and the researcher will only preserve and enhance the richness and complexity of the psychotherapeutic process as it unfolds over time (Rhodes & Greenberg, 1994) . In his revealing, autobiographical article, Jonathan Kellerman (1993) reflected on his dual career as novelist and psychologist as follows: "The divergence between the two, I believe, is that psychology, like any science, seeks to establish rules of prediction-to order the world. Fiction, on the other hand, concerns itself with the exceptions" (p. 216).
Both psychological scientists and psychological practitioners seem to believe that they alone are concerned with reality. It is interesting and perhaps not atypical that Kellerman, a psychologist whose career was predominantly in the practice rather than the production of research, identified with the science of psychology. Our results indicate that this is common among practitioners. Kellerman also reminded us that both clinical and academic journeys are rewarding and complementary.
Resolving the discrepancy between science and practice must take place on several levels. We offer the following suggestions: 
Scientists Must Link Better to Other Scientists
One way to start bridging the chasm is to overcome some of the separation that exists among groups of scientists. For years, linkages among research organizations devoted to understanding therapeutic change (e.g., Association for the Advancement of Behavior Therapy, Society for Psychotherapy Research, etc.) have been weak or nonexistent. Distinctions in the intervention methods studied (directive vs. evocative, London, 1986) , in the research methods used (group vs. N = 1 designs), and in the dependent variables measured (internal experience vs. external behaviors), although historically driving these organizations apart, have long since become fuzzy. Distinctions among behavioral, cognitive, psychotherapeutic, and psychoanalytic camps have little specificity of substance, for example. These labels drive wedges between groups of scientists, independently of those that separate scientists from practitioners. This is not to say that scientists will or should seek agreement among themselves. It is not in the nature of science to do so. Science thrives on controversy, the unknown, the unusual, and the exceptional. It is in the nature of science to question and critique both one's own work and that of others. But scientists can and should collaborate in the common objective of unmasking truth and in the common commitment to empirical methods of discovery. Then, the question becomes less, "what is truth?" and more, "what are the rules of evidence-the standards of "truth"-by which we will accept something as factual or fictional?" Addressing this question may force science to deal with its own biases.
Scientists Must Initiate and Maintain Relationships With Practitioners
There is a disconcerting tendency among scientists to abandon their affiliations with those who do not share their values. Our findings suggest that academic scientists may have to struggle more with the chasm between science and practice than do practitioners. Indeed, practitioners seem to be doing more to attend to and benefit from the work of scientists than scientists are to attending to and benefitting from that of practitioners. It is important that communication flow in both directions, that scientists become familiar with and address the phenomena that are important to practitioners. More should be done among scientists to investigate what clinicians have to offer.
Clinicians, when they do read research literature, are discriminating readers (Greenberg, 1994) , screening out that which does not fit their clinical sphere. The clinician will generally read research from the vantage point of his or her own, usually very personal, clinical experience, embracing research findings that support what he or she already holds true and disregarding findings that do not. According to one clinical writer (Spence, 1994) , a major hindrance to translating research findings into clinical practice arises from "the researchers' failure to ask the hard questions that strike at the heart of our basic assumptions" (p. 22). Spence has stated that the clinical literature contains "a wealth of (largely submerged) clinical clues that need to be systematically studied and brought to light in ways that do justice to their practical and theoretical importance" (p. 36). If, as we have suggested, researchers do not find value in reading clinical literature or conversing with clinicians, the clues, for the moment, will most likely stay submerged. It should be remembered that scientists are more dependent on the practitioner community for the survival of their findings than practitioners are on scientists. Practice will likely survive as long as patients are willing and interested in experiencing the processes that characterize practice, whether it be astrology or scientifically founded therapy. If scientists separate from those who are to implement research findings, either by abandoning professional organizations or by ignoring clinical input when developing and conducting research programs, clinical science is unlikely to survive. To the degree that scientists remain separate from practitioners, either geographically or symbolically, the likelihood increases that important research information will be ignored.
Reconsider the Role of Science for Practitioners
To establish two-way communication between practitioners and academic researchers, we must consider the possibility that there are multiple roads to understanding. Some clinicians may reach valid understandings by using clinical methods and experience. The problem with such uncontrolled and subjective methods as means of verifying truth, however, is that they may also lead in erroneous and unhelpful directions. They may produce "truth" based on spurious correlations and biased observations. Science may not be the most effective channel to clinical discovery, but it may be the only viable channel to the confirmation of clinical observations. Perhaps practitioners need not be led by scientific findings in the development of new methods because such findings are frequently unavailable. But science is a necessary step to validating these methods. Scientists must be willing to take the initiative in seeking out clinicians in order to confirm observations and test the value of clinical truths. It seems far too simplistic to suggest that we must listen to each other, but we are impressed that the prevailing view-that only knowledge that comes from science is of value-is inaccurate. This belief is sure to provoke fear, distance, and discord within our ranks. There are many ways to discover truths, but the scientific method offers the best hope of confirming what "truths" are factual.
Often, science provides an explanation and confirmation of what an effective practitioner already has discovered. In such instances, the contributions of new knowledge by science may be more valuable for the novice or the unskilled than for the proficient. Perhaps careful and objective observations of prototypic "master therapists" might allow us to establish new or improve old theories of clinical change. The example of Parelli reveals a role for clinical science in molding new clinicians, pro-viding needed assistance and direction to ineffective ones, and confirming the skills of effective ones.
Make Research Relevant to Clinicians
Of course, that research should be relevant goes without saying. But a less obvious point deserves to be underlined. Clinical material, through observation and reading, may help identify what research is relevant and needed among practitioners. Clinicians read research and find it applicable; it is academic scientist-practitioners who are not reading the ideas of and communicating with practitioners. The burden of proof is upon academic scientists, not upon practitioners, to demonstrate the value of research findings over experience.
Examples of ways to integrate research and clinical practice are presented by Beutler and Clarkin (1990) and more specifically by Kernberg and Clarkin's (1994) model of differential therapeutics with borderline personality disorder. The authors presented treatment choices such as setting, format, strategies and techniques, medication, and duration that should be the basis for empirical efficacy. Furthermore, Kernberg and Clarkin (1994) described a setting in which clinical training and exposure to research are combined with the goal of fostering the integration of clinical work and clinical research for psychologists in training. Training, according to these authors, is the way to integrate research and its relevant results into clinical practice for the optimal care of the patient. Clinicians and researchers alike must contribute to this integration. Polarization is promoted when the two groups read different journals, join different professional organizations, and work in different settings. Huberman (1990) added that in order for research to be fully utilized, researchers and practitioners must communicate during all phases of research: in project design, in data collection, and in the application of results.
According to Kiesler (1994) , psychotherapy research always has, and always will play "catch up" to psychotherapy practice because it is the researchers' responsibility to systematize, standardize, and operationalize available methods of treatment; validate promising interventions derived from clinical theory and practice; and seek to isolate and validate the vital ingredients of the change process. Talley, Strupp, and Butler (1994) recommended that, in order to benefit the present and future well-being of both researchers and clinicians, (a) research must provide a therapeutic context for its interpretation, (b) funding priorities must change to include the needs of practitioners, and (c) the use of research results by third party payers in a manner that is detrimental to the interests of patients and therapists alike must be changed.
It has been suggested (e.g., Elliot & Morrow-Bradley, 1994 ) that it would be useful to present single-case analyses of how a clinician uses research in practice. We would add to this suggestion the observation that single-case analyses of how a researcher uses clinical inquiry as a guide to the development and implementation of research may be revealing. In other words, the communication and experiences must flow in both directions for meaningful and lasting relationships to be established between clinicians and researchers.
We have found it useful in developing treatment manuals to hold focus groups with clinicians and with patients. We recently held a number of these as we were attempting to develop treatment programs for alcoholic women (Beutler, Patterson, Jacob, Shoham, Yost, & Rohrbaugh, 1994) . After developing a cognitive-behavioral manual to treat alcoholic couples, members of our research group (Wakefield, Williams, Yost, & Patterson, in press ) then revised and updated the treatment methods in accordance with the suggestions of the clinicians who were assigned to use the manual. The insights and suggestions were not only helpful, but the groups themselves cemented relations with a very difficult and distant community. We also have benefited from using real clinicians in our clinical trials, even though we find that many require a good deal of training and supervised experience before they are able to do what our treatments dictate.
Finally, we are finding it very useful to take our work to the practitioner community. For example, we are developing clinician interactive software packages that are based on actuarial algorithms for selecting and planning treatments (see Gaw & Beutler, 1995) . The patient dimensions used and the dimensions of treatment recommended as differential decisions are based both upon our own research and that of others. When the validation studies are completed, our initial work indicates that we will be able to provide clinicians with direct, empirically derived suggestions about selecting treatment settings, indicating the need for medication, prescribing the use of group and marital therapies, identifying the type of therapist and therapeutic stance to assume, and constructing effective treatment strategies. Among the latter recommendations will be suggestions on the short-and longterm goals of treatment, whether to employ insight-versus symptom-focused interventions, the optimal balance of directive and evocative procedures, and when to employ confrontational versus supportive strategies (Beutler, Consoli, & Williams, 1995; Gaw & Beutler, 1995) . Specific, illustrative techniques from various manuals are being incorporated with these strategic recommendations.
Develop Vehicles for Translating Science to Practice
Our results reveal that clinicians and academic researchers prefer different vehicles for communicating with one another. Our survey not only suggests that the two groups read different types of material, but that they look for contact from one another in different places. It may be that the way to accomplish the goal of incorporating research findings into practice is not for practitioners to read more primary research articles, but for researchers to communicate through those channels of correspondence that clinicians value in their pursuits of knowledge. Although clinicians read research journals at a higher rate than many believe, this is not the preferred method of receiving knowledge. It may behoove researchers to read and contribute more to professional newsletters and newspapers than to try to persuade clinicians to read more research-oriented journals.
Indeed, there are other reasons that would suggest that research journals are not ideal vehicles for translating research into practice. Individual research findings are too unstable and are usually too technical to be directly applied. Practitioners have a need for more constancy of what is "factual" than any probabilistic empirical finding can promise. There is a need to retain conventional journals as means of fostering communication among scientists. Yet, it may be wise for scientists to enter the arena of becoming translators of scientific research.
Our findings indicate that practitioners read and obtain information from popular books, workshops, and association newsletters, organs that are not ordinarily research based. In many fields, the gap between science and practice is bridged by practice journals and guidebooks that are specifically designed and written by scientists, not by other practitioners. In education, for example, teachers are not expected to translate scientific knowledge into the "how" and "when" of education for the benefit of other teachers. This is the responsibility of scientists. Thus, there are journals and books written by educational researchers with the specific purpose of translating scientific findings into practice and instructing teachers in their application. Examples of such journals are Academic Therapy, Teacher Education and Special Education, Journal of Behavioral Education, and The Pointer.
The results of our survey also indicate that there is a need for scientifically founded trade books and workshops, written and conducted by research scientists to distill and convey the best scientific knowledge available. These must stir practitioner interest, confirm the importance of practice, and make for rewarding reading. Although the practice is new in psychology and mental health, there are a few examples of the development of integrative professional groups (e.g., Society for the Exploration of Psychotherapy Integration, Association for the Advancement of Behavior Therapy) and of professional journals that are devoted to integrating research and practice in psychology (e.g., In Session: Psychotherapy in Practice, Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice).
